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Testing Genuine Savings as a forward-looking indicator of future well-being over the (very) 
long-run. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Genuine Savings (GS) has been much used in recent years as an indicator of a country’s 
sustainability. According to some theorists (e.g. Arrow et al, 2012), under certain conditions 
a country with a positive level of GS should experience non-declining future utility, given the 
assumption of unlimited substitutability among all forms of capital (sometimes called 
“weak” sustainability). This paper reports the first very long-run tests of GS (also called 
comprehensive investment or adjusted net savings) as a forward-looking indicator of future 
well-being. We assemble data for British capital back to 1765, and construct several net 
investment measures which are used as indicators of two alternative measures of future 
well-being: consumption per capita and real wages.  An allowance for a “value of time” due 
to exogenous technological progress is included in some GS measures, and we demonstrate 
the importance of this measure and the choice of discount rate over the very long-run. On 
the whole, our results do not reject the postulated relationship between GS and future well-
being, and show GS can be a forward looking indicator of future well-being for periods of up 
to 100 years. 
 
Keywords:  sustainable development, genuine savings, comprehensive investment, 
future well-being, British economic history, technological progress. 
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1. Introduction: Genuine Savings as an indicator of sustainable development 
 
The idea of using a nation’s Genuine Savings (also referred to as Comprehensive Investment, 
Inclusive Investment and Adjusted Net Savings) as a forward-looking indicator of “weak” 
sustainability is now well-known [1-6]. Pearce and Atkinson [7] were the first to suggest that 
the change over time in a country’s  capital stocks was an indicator of the sustainability of its 
development path. This relies on the assumption that all forms of capital – produced, 
natural, human and social capital - can be aggregated in monetary units and are perfectly 
substitutable for each other in terms of maintaining well-being over time. These theoretical 
postulates underpin theories of “weak” sustainability, as opposed to theories of “strong” 
sustainability that deny the possibility of either aggregating monetized values for all capital, 
and/or the possibility of their unlimited substitution. Genuine Savings (GS) estimates have 
been reported for virtually of all the world’s economies, typically using World Bank datasets 
[e.g. 3, 8] for years after 1970, and longer time series of GS for individual countries have also 
become available [9].  
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between increasingly-comprehensive 
measures of GS and two well-being indicators for Great Britain over the period 1765-2000. 
We test a set of hypotheses which relate GS to changes in future well-being, using the 
framework suggested by Ferreira, Hamilton and Vincent [10], and investigate whether well-
being and GS measures are cointegrated over time to improve the power of our hypothesis 
testing. In doing so, we also provide a test of an important general result in neoclassical 
growth theory originally associated with Weitzman [11]. Our paper considerably extends the 
scope of the existing literature by considering patterns of GS and well-being over a very 
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long-time period for a single country: existing empirical tests rely on very-much shorter-run 
panels. 
Sustainable development has been defined by Arrow et al [5] as an economic path along 
which intergenerational well-being does not decline over time. Well-being at time t is 
defined as the present value of discounted utility from consumption (measured in monetary 
terms) over the accounting period, assuming a constant discount rate. This requires that 
“comprehensive wealth”- the value of the economy’s assets - be non-declining over the 
same period. Arrow et al then define comprehensive investment as the change in 
comprehensive wealth at time t, and claim that intergenerational well-being is rising if 
comprehensive investment – Genuine Savings, in the terminology of paragraph one above – 
is positive when evaluated at the correct shadow prices.  Pezzey [12] defined sustainability 
differently to Arrow et al (2012), and argued that GS is a one-sided indicator only, in that a 
negative value of GS at time t leads to falling well-being over time (in his model, well-being 
is an economy’s per-person utility), but no equivalent statement can be made for a positive 
level of GS and non-declining well-being. Pezzey [12] also noted that this one-sided 
predictive ability of GS only holds in present value maximising (optimal) economies with a 
constant discount rate.1 Finally, the GS indicator can be adjusted to deal with exogenous 
changes in the production possibilities of an economy (exogenous technological change, for 
instance) and/or changes in population which must be addressed for the link with future 
well-being to hold [12]. Despite their differences, the work of both Arrow et al, and Pezzey, 
provide a strong motivation for the empirical testing of GS as an indicator of sustainability 
over the long-run. 
                                                          
1
  Pezzey [12] also shows that a declining value of Green Net National Product implies falling future utility in 
this optimal economy. 
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The relationship between a country’s asset base, annual changes in this asset base and 
future well-being is also a feature of neo-classical growth theory.  Weitzman [11] showed 
that in an economy producing a single consumption good from a capital stock which 
comprises natural as well as produced capital, and that is proceeding along a path which 
maximises the present value of consumption from time zero to infinity at a constant 
discount rate r, net national product is given by the Hamiltonian of the associated 
constrained optimisation problem.2 As Ferreira and Vincent [2] pointed out, this result 
implies that average future consumption will be greater than current consumption if GS 
(which they call net investment) is positive and net investments in all forms of capital are 
measured using the correct shadow prices (although this does not rule out consumption 
levels falling between some periods). The Weitzman result also implies that the relationship 
between GS and changes in future consumption can be used to test whether an economy is 
following an optimal development path [13].3 In the next two sections, we review the 
empirical testing framework to be used in this paper, and show how it relates to the 
underlying theory. 
 
1.1. Testing Genuine Savings: a framework, and previous results 
 
In this paper, we make use of the theoretical and empirical testing framework set out in 
Ferreira, Hamilton and Vincent [10] (FHV, hereafter).  Starting from the model of Hamilton 
and Hartwick [14], FHV showed, with a constant population growth rate of γ, a population at 
                                                          
2
 Ferreira and Vincent [2] note that this constant discount rate is a reasonable assumption given their data on 
world economic development over the period 1970-2001. 
3
 We thank Jack Pezzey for pointing this out to us.  
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time t of N, a consumption discount rate of ρ4, and year-on-year change in produced capital 
K denoted ̇  ,  that per capita genuine savings g is given by: 
  
 ̇
 
              (1) 
where         is the shadow value of per capita natural capital extraction (e.g. fossil fuel 
extraction) and ω is per capita wealth, which is the sum of per capita natural and produced 
capital stocks W at time t divided by the population N.  This shows GS is determined by per 
capita net change in produced and natural capital (the first two terms on the right-hand side 
of equation 1) adjusted by a “wealth dilution effect” from population growth    . The key 
theoretical relationship derived by FHV is that in any period t, the value of g is equal to the 
discounted value of changes in per capita consumption from t to infinity if the consumption 
discount rate ρ is adjusted downwards by the (constant) population growth rate [15].   
If population grows at a varying rate, then the relationship between per capita GS and the 
present value of changes in future consumption is altered. FHV expressed this new 
relationship in discrete time as follows: 
∑
(
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        (2) 
where for country i, W represents total (produced plus natural) capital, t is time, and all the 
other terms are as described above. W can be extended to include other forms of capital, 
such as human or social capital. Equation (2) states that, in a competitive economy,5 the per 
capita rate of genuine saving for country i at time t should be equal to the present value of 
                                                          
4
 Note that we therefore use a constant discount rate (one that does not vary over time) in our empirical 
procedures. 
5
 Note that Hamilton and Hartwck [14] also assume that all externalities are internalised, which is clearly not 
borne out in reality. 
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future changes in per capita consumption adjusted for a term which shows the effects of 
population growth on per capita wealth – the wealth dilution effect with non-constant 
population growth rates. FHV then derived from (2) two equations which can be estimated 
to test if (2) holds.  With varying population growth rates, the equation to be estimated is: 
                                   (3) 
If population grows at a constant rate over time, then (3) simplifies to: 
                         (4) 
For both (3) and (4), the strictest test of the theoretical prediction shown by (2) is that β0 = 0 
and β1 = 1 jointly. 
Ferreira and Vincent [2] was the first paper to test empirically whether GS is indeed a 
forward looking indicator of sustainability defined as achieving rising average well-being 
over time, using the general framework set out above.6 As they observed, “...the reliability 
of empirical estimates of comprehensive net investment as [a] sustainability indicator has 
gone unexamined”. Their paper used World Bank data from 1970 – 2001 for 93 countries, 
although the need to calculate the difference between average future and current 
consumption means that they tested a version of (4) only over the period 1970-1991. 
Ferreira and Vincent proposed four alternative measures of net changes in a country’s 
assets; gross investment in produced capital; net investment in produced capital; net 
investment adjusted for depletion of natural capital (green net savings), and finally green 
net savings augmented by investment in education, which they termed Genuine Savings. 
                                                          
6
 Although they use the difference between average future consumption and current-period consumption as 
the left-hand side variable, rather than the present value of changes in future consumption. 
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They then tested three hypotheses relevant to this paper which represent increasingly-strict 
interpretations of the underlying theory noted above: 
H*: β0 = 0 and β1 = 1  
H**: β1 > 0 and  1 as the net investment term includes more types of capital (that is, as 
the measure of year-on-year changes in total capital is more-comprehensive). 
H***: β1 > 0. 
Their results showed that H* is rejected for all definitions of net investment. For H**, they 
found that β1 is always positive, and that its absolute value increases as more 
comprehensive measures of the capital stock are used, although it falls when education 
spending is included. The authors speculated that this reflects the extent to which current 
education spending is a poor measure of changes in the stock of human capital.  H*** is not 
rejected. Changing the time period over which present values are calculated to 20 years 
rather than 10 years results in higher values for β1.  
World Bank [3] examined the empirical support for GS theory using OLS regressions across a 
number of countries for 5 consecutive 20-year periods using data from 1976-2000, but 
found rather mixed signals because of the number of “false positive” and “false negative” 
predictions of changes in future consumption which can be made using estimates of net 
investment. For both gross saving and genuine saving, they found that they cannot reject β1 
=1, concluding that “…Genuine Savings is a good predictor of changes in future welfare as 
measured by consumption per capita” (p. 82). 
Finally, FHV [10] used (3) and (4) above to test the relationship between the present value 
of changes in future consumption and genuine savings. They employed a World Bank data 
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set of 64 developing countries over the period 1970-2003, which implies an estimation 
period of 1970-1982 to  measure discounted changes in future consumption over a 20 year 
period. As in Ferreira and Vincent [2], this study used increasingly-comprehensive measures 
of changes in a country’s assets: gross savings, net savings (i.e. net investment in produced 
capital), green savings (net savings minus depreciation of elements of natural capital) and 
population-adjusted savings (green savings adjusted by the wealth dilution term). This 
allowance for the wealth dilution effect is the main conceptual change over Ferreira and 
Vincent [2]. They tested the joint hypothesis that β0 = 0 and β1 = 1; and a weaker hypothesis 
that β1 > 0. Their most “striking result” is that the hypothesis β1 > 0 is supported only for 
green savings and its population-adjusted equivalent. However, the estimates of β1 remain 
“significantly below 1” in all four models. They also concluded that there was a “lack of 
significant impact for the adjustment for wealth dilution” (p.246).  
 
1.2 Testing Genuine Savings in the (very) long-run 
 
There is thus rather limited evidence on the link between GS and future well-being. In this 
paper we aim to extend FHV in a number of important ways. First, we assemble and then 
use a data set which extends over a much longer time period, at around 250 years. We test 
whether the implications of theory concerning the relationship between GS and future well-
being are borne out in this long run data. Given that sustainable development is a long-term 
policy concern, and that the theoretical models behind the GS indicator are cast in infinite 
time, this seems an important and novel advantage. Second, we investigate the effects of 
allowing for a “value of time passing”; treating time as an uncontrolled capital stock that 
through exogenous technological progress expands the economy’s production possibilities 
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[16]. Such technological change is, as we will see, an issue that becomes pressing over 
longer time-frames. Third, we include changes in human capital, measured through 
investments in education. World Bank [3] note that the process of development can be 
characterised as countries converting natural capital into other forms of capital including 
human capital, whilst Arrow et al [5] also acknowledge the importance of investments in 
human capital. Finally, we test two alternative indicators of future well-being: changes in 
the present value of consumption, as per FHV; and changes in the present value of real 
wages. Hypotheses tests are accompanied by tests for cointegrating relationships to show 
the robustness of results.  
Based on (3) and (4) above, the main hypotheses tests relate to the theoretical relationship 
between GS and future well-being: 
              
 
  
      (5) 
where all terms are as in (4) except that   
  
 can now include both changes in human capital 
and the value of technological progress as part of the stock of capital, as well as changes in 
produced and natural capital. If we allow for non-constant population growth rates and a 
wealth-dilution effect then the relevant theoretical relationship is: 
                          
 
  
     (6) 
Based on (5) and (6), the hypotheses to be tested are then: 
H1: β0 = 0 and β1 = 1 jointly 
H2: β0 = 0 and/or β1 = 1 independently 
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We conduct these tests over three different forward-looking periods, which are t+20, t+ 50 
and t+100.  The hypotheses tests are conducted for an increasingly-comprehensive set of 
measures of the capital stock. The hypotheses tests for our core results are based on (5), but 
with i=1 (since our data is for one country only). One of the sensitivity analyses includes the 
wealth-dilution effect, and is thus based on (6). We also examine the effects of using 
changes in future real wages rather than changes in future consumption as the indicator of 
future well-being; the effects of changing the discount rate used in the calculation of 
present values; and the effects of changing the data period over which we conduct the 
hypotheses tests based on (5). In what follows, section 2 sets out the data on which our 
hypothesis testing is based. Section 3 presents our core results and the sensitivity analyses 
for the two alternative well-being indicators. Section 4 concludes, and offers some 
directions for future work. 
2. Data 
 
Our data relate to Great Britain, and descriptive statistics for the key variables are reported 
in the Data Appendix. As some historical and modern data pertains to the entirety of the 
United Kingdom at any given time, for some series this necessitates an adjustment for the 
exclusion of the whole of Ireland before 1921, and Northern Ireland thereafter. The 
economic and environmental history of Ireland is sufficiently distinct from that of Great 
Britain to warrant this procedure, and also ensures that we are dealing with a consistent 
geographical unit over time.  
 
Of course, the quality of the data both for the distant past and more recent years is crucial 
to the reliability of our tests. The historical data constructions draw upon a long tradition of 
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scholarship in quantitative economic history, for a survey see Greasley and Oxley [76]. For 
the British economy especially, the quantitative-historical record running back to the 
eighteenth century is of a remarkably high standard for most of the variables needed for the 
series 1-5 below. Thus, in areas which have been subject to extensive scrutiny by historians, 
for example national accounts including investment, wages and prices, and the coal 
industry, we have been able to draw upon reliable estimates. In particular, we have made 
extensive use of Charles Feinstein’s highly regarded research which set out historical 
produced-investment series, constructed to mesh with contemporary data. Some areas 
have received less attention from quantitative historians, for example estimates for 
elements of natural and also of human capital. Further historical research in these areas 
would be valuable  
 
In this study we have largely used data series widely-accepted by economic historians. We 
have indicated below where data are less certain and discuss how the data quality might 
affect the results. Historians’ reconstructions have been linked to Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) estimates, utilizing consistent definitions. Feinstein’s [17] important 
estimates of historical national income, output and expenditures for the years 1855-1965 
were defined to splice with modern CSO/ONS estimates, and his investment data for earlier 
years follow the same procedures. Fuller [75] assessed the quality of Feinstein’s data and 
highlighted their value for gauging changes over time. Inevitably, the reliability of the 
historical data, especially for years before 1855 is less than for contemporary ONS 
estimates, although we would venture that the quality of British historical data stands 
favourably in comparison to World Bank estimates of some African and Asian countries.  
Fuller details of the data sources are in the Data Appendix and McLaughlin et al [18].  
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To conduct the hypotheses tests H1 and H2, a series of increasingly-comprehensive 
measures of investment are constructed:  
1.  NETPINV: annual changes in net produced capital and net overseas assets 
2. GREENINV: NETPINV plus changes in elements of the stock of natural capital 
3.  GS: GREENINV plus changes in human capital 
4. GREENTFP and GSTFP: GREENINV and GS plus the value of changes in exogenous 
technological progress 
5. GSWPOP and GSTFPWPOP: GS and GSTFP less wealth dilution per capita 
 
2.1 NETPINV, net domestic investment and net overseas assets 
 
Produced investment comprises net domestic fixed capital formation, changes in inventories 
and net foreign investment. These data are from Feinstein & Pollard [19], Feinstein [17] and 
ONS publications. Table 1 shows the nominal values of the series relative to nominal GDP. 
Feinstein’s GDP data as reported in Measuring Worth [20] are utilized here. They use a 
variety of balancing procedures for combining income, output and expenditure estimates, 
see Officer [21]. Measuring Worth’s GDP estimates are spliced with those of Broadberry et 
al [22] in 1870.  The latter is an output-based series for Great Britain. Since our post 1870 
data are scaled for the exclusion of Ireland, the Broadberry et al estimate of British GDP in 
1870 is adopted as the level benchmark in the splicing. 
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Table 1 near here 
 
The average value of net produced investment relative to GDP was nearly twice as high 
1860-1914, compared the preceding century 1760-1860. This was largely due to higher net 
overseas investment. Produced investment fell dramatically during the world wars, and the 
investment ratio was low between 1914 and 1945. The recovery of produced investment 
after 1945 was largely due to a rise in domestic fixed capital formation. 
 
2.2 GREENINV: NETPINV plus changes in the stock of natural capital 
 
Our measure of green investment includes changes in the forestry stock and the extraction 
of coal, oil, natural gas, iron ore, lead, copper, tin, and zinc.7 Shadow prices for each capital 
stock change are ideally calculated by subtracting the marginal cost from the price to 
correspond to the theoretical model from which the GS indicator is derived. In practice, we 
make use of market prices and, typically, average rather than marginal costs. This means 
that our numerical estimate of GS does not correspond exactly to its theoretical equivalent 
– as is true for all World Bank estimates.  
 
As direct data on the area or stocking rate of all British woodland was not collected until 
well into the twentieth century, our estimates must proceed from fragmentary information 
and research by landscape and environmental historians. The area of British woodland rose 
from around 1 million hectares in 1765 to around 3 million in 2000, augmenting the stock of 
natural capital. This shift is well-established and it is clear that nearly all of the change 
                                                          
7
 Full data sources are outlined in the appendix and McLaughlin et al [18]. 
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occurred during the twentieth century, and before 1900 the stocking rate of woodlands was 
both low and changed little, with a nadir of the standing volume around 1871. Despite 
substantial felling during the world wars, standing volume rose during the twentieth 
century, most markedly after 1945. Thus despite the paucity of direct data, our estimates 
can be considered reliable, and augmentation or diminishing of natural capital through 
change in the stock of timber was vanishingly small before 1900. Moreover, the increase in 
the rental value of woodlands has been low relative to produced investment or GDP. A 
variety of timber prices are used to estimate the price per cubic metre (see the Data 
Appendix) and combined with felling costs, essentially the cost of labour per cubic metre 
felled, to gauge changes in the value of standing volumes. The sharpest rise in the rental 
values of woodland occurred in the period after 1946 and averaged 0.18% of GDP, whereas 
the deepest decline occurred 1914-18, when around one-third of the forest stock was felled, 
and the fall in rental value averaged -0.18% of GDP. 
 
The British economy extracted substantial quantities of non-renewable mineral resources 
over the last 250 years, and the issue has received a commensurate amount of attention 
from historians. Trends in extraction and costs of coal are well-known. Coal mining 
dominated mineral extraction until the 1970s, and oil and gas thereafter. Extracted coal 
rents are measured by the difference between pithead coal prices and labour costs per 
tonne, multiplied by coal production, using the sources described in the Data Appendix. In 
the case of oil and gas marginal extraction costs are near zero, and the value of production 
is used to measure the value of extracted rents. While production estimates for iron ore, 
copper, tin, zinc and lead are extant, detailed information on extraction costs is missing. 
These industries declined in importance during the nineteenth century, and the 1907 
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Industrial Census only distinguishes employment in coal and iron mining. However this does 
mean that labour productivity in coal and iron mining, and average extraction costs per ton, 
can be gauged at this date. Methods of extraction in the smaller metal mining industries was 
similar to iron ore in the nineteenth century and changed little over this period, and thus 
labour costs per tonne are taken here to be the same for all mining of metals.  
 
In the two centuries prior to 1960, the value of extracted mineral rents averaged around 2% 
of GDP, chiefly from coal mining. Thereafter coal rents became less important, but the 
extraction of North Sea oil pushed overall mineral rents to a peak of around 7% of GDP in 
the 1980s, then falling to around 2.5% of GDP in the 1990s. The extracted rental value of 
other minerals was low relative to GDP. That of iron ore peaked around 1870 at 0.65% of 
GDP and fell to around 0.05% by 1900. Collectively extracted rents from lead, zinc, tin and 
copper ores reached around 0.2% of GDP by 1850 but dwindled to around 0.02% by the 
1920s. 
2.3. GS: GREENINV plus changes in human capital 
 
As with the World Bank methodology, we have incorporated public expenditure on 
schooling into our GS calculations as a proxy for investments in human capital. Data on 
public expenditure on education were derived from Carpentier [23] for the period 1833-
1997, 8 and UNESCO measures thereafter. There are advantages and limitations to proxying 
the human capital by education expenditure. Investment in education fits naturally into the 
GS framework, which articulates the varying components of investment. However, human 
capital formation does not simply equate to education investment, since it includes, for 
                                                          
8
 Carpentier [24, 25] gives an English language overview of the methodology and findings of Carpentier [23]. 
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example, skills acquired in the workplace. This problem is all the more significant in earlier 
periods before universal schooling, which was only established up until age 15 in the mid-
twentieth century in the UK.9 This partly explains the dramatic upward shift in education 
spending after WWII: public education investment averaged 0.76% of GDP 1765-1914 and 
rose through the twentieth century to average 4.3% of GDP 1946-2000. 
 
2.4 GREENTFP and GSTFP: GREENINV and GS plus the value of changes in technological 
progress   
 
Weitzman [26] and Pemberton and Ulph [27] advocated the inclusion of exogenous 
techological progress in assessments of the capital stocks of a country. Arrow et al [5] also 
include the value of technological progress as part of a country’s capital stock. Pezzey [12] 
and Pezzey et al [16], refer to such technological progress as part of a “value of time 
passing”, which increases the future consumption possibilities of an economy. They further 
argue shifts in the terms of trade for natural resource exports should be part of the value of 
time. The case for including exogenous technological progress within a more comprehensive 
investment measure appears strong in light of the widespread evidence that residual 
productivity plays a central role in the consumption growth of OECD countries [2]. In 
contrast there is no convincing evidence that the terms of trade favour natural resource 
exports over the long run [28], and we limit the augmenting of GS for the value of time to 
technological progress, using a measure of trend growth in total factor productivity, TFP. 
 
An annual TFP index was constructed as follows:  
                                                          
9
 We are currently assembling an alternative data set for human capital based on discounted lifetime earnings. 
However there are conceptual and empirical problems with this approach too.  
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TFP = GDP/(Labourα Capital1-α)                          (7) 
where Labour is measured as hours worked, Capital is the stock of reproduced capital, and α 
is the elasticity of output with respect to labour. The resulting TFP index conforms to 
interpretations of British economic growth such as Crafts [29] and Voth [30], which show 
low TFP growth rates before the 1850s, and acceleration in the twentieth century. Trend 
TFP growth, was extracted from the annual index using the Kalman filter, and is shown as 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 near here 
     
Trend growth TFP estimates can be used to underpin the valuation of exogenous 
technological progress. Arrow et al [5] simply augmented their measure of comprehensive 
investment with the current value of TFP, which shows how technological progress 
increases current income. Strictly, however, treating time as an uncontrolled capital stock 
means TFP’s contribution to the change in wealth in any year should be included in our 
measure of GS. Our approach to gauging how TFP contributes to changes in the value of 
wealth follows Pezzey et al [16, Equation 14] but calculates the present value of future 
changes in TFP over 20 and 30 year horizons, to reflect the uncertainty over how long the 
value of technological progress persists, using both 2.5% per annum and 3.5% per annum 
discount rates (the choice of these rates is explained in section 3.1). The GSTFP sample 
period runs from 1765-1989; thus with the 30 year horizon trend grwoth TFP estimates are 
needed for the years 1765-2019.  The estimates for 2008-19 data are based on an ARIMA 
forecast. According to this methodology, in the case of a 20 year horizon with a 2.5% per 
annum discount rate the value of discounted technological progress relative to the current 
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value of GDP increases over time. 1765-1799 the average is 2.21%, 1800-1899 it is 7.85%, 
1900-1949 it is 15.34%, and 1950-1999 it is 21.21%.10  The contribution is less if we use a 
3.5% per annum discount rate (averaging 1.82, 6.47, 12.63 and 17.55% of GDP for the same 
time-spans); however, using a 30 rather than a 20 year time horizon has little effect. 
 
Treating technological progress as an uncontrolled stock of capital associated with the 
‘passing of time’ which can be measured by TFP assumes that all technological progress is 
exogenous [27]. This is clearly not the case empirically, and part of the TFP might arise from, 
for example, R&D spending.  A particular issue for the GSTFP measure is its inclusion of 
public education investment, which might be associated with endogenous technological 
change. This introduces an element of double-counting into the measure. Accordingly, our 
empirical tests also consider an alternative formulation of technology-augmented 
investment, GREENTFP, which adds the technological progress premium to GREENINV. 
2.5 GSWPOP and GSTFPWPOP 
 
The measure of aggregate wealth follows the World Bank [3, 8]’s ‘top-down’ construction 
method. FHV [10], alternatively, directly measure elements of aggregate wealth, but their 
approach is not followed here in the absence of complete information on individual wealth 
components, but we do utilize their concept of wealth dilution. The World Bank measure 
identifies wealth with the present value of an estimated stream of consumption over 25 
years. Wherever possible our preference is to directly measure the elements of aggregate 
wealth. However, for testing the sensitivity of GS to possible wealth dilution associated with 
                                                          
10
 It is interesting to compare the size of this adjustment with Weitzman [26]: he found that a technological 
change premium could be as high as 40% of NNP. However, his figures are for a notional economy rather than 
real data. 
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population growth, there is no viable alternative to a top-down measure of aggregate 
wealth in the absence of complete human and social capital data. The underlying 
consumption data post-1870 is from estimates of national accounts [17, and ONS]. For 
earlier years measures of public spending and occasional estimates of the ratio of private 
consumption to GDP have been utilized as described in the Data Appendix. 
2.6 Comparing the Investment Measures 
 
The increasingly-comprehensive measures NETPINV, GREENINV, GS, GREENTFP, GSTFP, 
GSWPOP and GSTFPWPOP are illustrated as Figures 2, 3 and 4.   The real value of British GS 
per capita and of GS as a percentage of GDP was mainly positive over the period 1765-2000, 
although both measures were negative during the World Wars.11 GS rose during the 
Industrial Revolution from less than 2% of GDP in the 1760s, to around 5% by the 1850s, 
although there was a dip during the Napoleonic Wars. Natural resource depletion was offset 
by a rise in domestic fixed capital formation in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 
contrast, a rise in net overseas investment underpinned the continuing rise in the GS/GDP 
ratio in the period 1850-1910 to a peak of around 9%.  
 
 
Figure 2 near here 
 
Figure 3 near here 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Real GS per capita incorporates GDP deflators [22, 20] to convert to year 2000 prices. 
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The GS/GDP ratio fell during and between the World Wars, reflecting falls in domestic and 
overseas investment. The post-war recovery of the ratio to its 1960s peak of around 14% 
was driven by domestic fixed capital formation and higher investment in education. 
Subsequently, the ratio halved in the final quarter of the twentieth century as the extraction 
of oil rents surged and there was a relative fall in domestic capital formation. Continuingly 
high levels of education investment, which averaged around 5% of GDP in the period 1970-
2000, ameliorated the decline in GS/GDP. The effects of augmenting GS with the value of 
technology are also most substantial in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Technology-augmented GS shows positive values throughout the period 1760-2000 and 
averages 29% of GDP from 1960 to 2000, using a 2.5% per annum discount rate, or 26% of 
GDP from 1960 to 2000 using a 3.5% per annum discount rate. 
 
GS, adjusted for the wealth dilution (Figure 4) caused by distributing capital among a larger 
population, shows negative values over extended periods, including the whole of the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, only during the 1960s was GSWPOP persistently positive. These 
data need to be judged in the context of the top-down measure of wealth, which assumes a 
stable long-run relationship between consumption and wealth. However they highlight, in 
periods of sustained population growth which in Great Britain averaged around 1% per 
annum over the 150 years before 1914, that wealth dilution raised a high barrier to 
improving future well-being. Further, they highlight the potentially important role of new 
technology in offsetting wealth dilution, given that GSTFPWPOP is positive for most of the 
twentieth century. 
Figure 4 near here 
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2.7 Measuring well-being over time 
 
Following FHV [10], we have calculated the present value of future changes in consumption 
per capita as the well-being measure which accords most closely with the predictions of the 
theoretical framework for Genuine Savings. However, annual estimates of consumption are 
only extant from 1870 [17]. Longer runs of real wages are available, and we make use of the 
compilations reported in Measuring Worth [31]; given our desire to test the GS model with 
data from 1765. Three time horizons (20, 50, 100 years) and discount rates of 2.5% per 
annum and 3.5% per annum are used in the construction of both well-being measures.  
Figure 5 illustrates these data using a 2.5% per annum discount rate. Over shorter 20 year 
time horizons real wages can be volatile and they sometimes fall. The 100 year time horizon 
gives a smoother series, which must end in 1909 given that the actual wage series runs to 
2009. One feature of the series using a 50 year time horizon is the marked rise in the PV of 
real wage increases from 1909, which chiefly reflects real wage shifts in the second half of 
the twentieth century. 
 
Figure 5 near here 
 
3. Estimation methods and test results 
 
We now provide a discussion of the estimation methods and the results of the tests outlined 
in section 1.2 as applied to the various measures of GS and well-being outlined in section 2. 
Our empirical models adopt two, alternative measures of future well-being; real 
consumption per capita and average real wages, which are linked to increasingly-
comprehensive measures of investment, including technology-augmented measures. 
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Consumption estimates are extant for years from 1870, whereas estimates of real wages 
cover the period 1765-2009.  
 
3.1 Estimation methods 
The long spans of the univariate macroeconomic time series data used in the estimation and 
testing of the various models have the potential to exhibit non-stationary properties. Thus, 
without appropriate methods, estimates may be inefficient or spurious and the usual 
significance tests may be invalid. Engle and Granger [77] show that a linear combination of 
two or more series that are integrated of order 1 may be stationary. The linear combination, 
if it exists, defines a cointegrating equation where the resulting vector characterizes the 
long-run relationship between the variables. A cointegration estimation approach: i) 
resolves the problem of non-stationary time series data and the inference issues of its 
neglect, ii) has the interpretation that the cointegrating relationship (if it exists) can be 
regarded as a (potentially) unique long-run economic equilibrium relationship, iii) has the 
properties that the estimates are 'super-consistent' i.e. they are consistent with much 
smaller sample sizes, iv) 'washes-out' in the long-run random errors that may exist in one or 
both series and, v) means inferences can be made on the levels of the series.  If 
cointegration exists, the power of its long-run properties dominates short-run variations, 
which by definition are going to be stationary. 
 
Cointegrating relationships, however, and their benefits and properties do not exist with all 
combinations of non-stationary series - there is a need to test for their existence. The two-
step test used here appraises the time series properties of the residuals in a levels OLS 
regression, where the null hypothesis is of no-cointegration. The Engle-Granger method 
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follows the OLS regression with a test of the error term’s order of integration as step two. 
The residuals derived from the step-one process have the property of a generated regressor 
(Oxley and McAleer [78], Greasley and Oxley [79]).  The critical values of the ADF test in the 
results’ tables adjust for this property. A case of non-cointegration does not necessarily 
invalidate the results, but they are less robust. At this point we reiterate that in the results 
presented below we are specifically and only considering the results as tests of the size and 
signs of β0 and β1.  
 
3. 2 Net produced, green and genuine investment and future real wages 
 
Using the estimation and testing framework outlined above, we firstly consider the 
relationship between future real wages, produced investment (NETPINV), green investment 
(GREENINV) and Genuine Savings (GS). The dependent variable is the present value of the 
future changes in real wages over 20, 50 and 100 years. Accordingly, for the shortest 20 year 
time horizon, and given that the real wage series runs to 2009, the sample period of 
investment must be 1765-1989, and for the 100 year time horizon it is 1765-1909. The rate 
chosen to discount future changes in real wages has important implications, especially over 
the 100 year time horizon. We prefer a discount rate of 2.5% per annum which equates to 
the average real interest on long British government bonds 1765-2000, but to test sensitivity 
we also report results using 3.5% per annum, the average rate used by FV for their post-
1970 panel of countries. 
 
The results in Tables 2 and 3 shows that time horizons and discount rates have greater 
influence on the estimated parameters than the alternative investment measures. 
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Ostensibly the estimates for GREENINV and GS over the 100 years horizon with a 3.5% per 
annum discount rate give most support to the hypothesis of present investment indicating 
future real wages. In this case the weaker hypothesis β1=1 cannot be rejected where a 
cointegrating relationship has not been rejected. None of the results support the strong 
joint hypothesis β0=0; β1=1. The weaker hypothesis appears sensitive to the choice of 
discount rate, with all the estimated coefficients showing markedly higher values with a 
2.5% per annum discount rate over the longest horizon. In the case of GS over the 100 year 
time horizon, the estimate of β1=2.71 suggests that investment leads to higher future well-
being, discounted at 2.5% per annum, than theory predicts. If the theory holds, one 
possibility is that the GS measure does not fully capture or accurately measure all relevant 
investment. The other possibility is the value of future real wages, discounted at 2.5% per 
annum, does not properly measure future well-being. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 about here 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 3 Net produced, green and genuine investment and future consumption per capita 
 
The present value of changes in future consumption per capita provides an alternative 
measure of well-being which accords more closely with theory, but these data are only 
available from 1870. The estimates of β1 over the 100 years consumption horizon using a 
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2.5% per annum discount rate show rising values of 0.4, 0.68 and 1.04 as the measure of net 
investment becomes more comprehensive, see Table 4. However, the statistical significance 
of the estimated parameters for GS needs to be treated with caution in the absence of 
cointegration. We only observe cointegration between GS and the PV of consumption 
change over the 20-year time horizon, but not for all other relationships, and none of the 
results are supportive of the stronger joint hypothesis. 
Table 4 about here 
 
3. 4 Investment, technology and future well-being 
 
In their landmark paper, Ferreira and Vincent did not find that GS had positive and 
significant effects on the future consumption of OECD countries, a result they attribute to 
their measure of GS excluding technical change. Longer time horizons reinforce the 
importance of including technology in measures of wealth. A series of theoretical papers 
have shown how omitting technological progress from the calculation of GS can be 
misleading [5, 12 and 26]. Table 5 reports the estimated parameters, in the case of the value 
of future consumption, from augmenting GREENINV and GS with the value of technological 
progress, using the alternative indicators discussed in section 2.4. As GS includes 
expenditures on education, which may be partially reflected in TFP, using the two measures 
GREENTFP and GSTFP sheds light on possible double counting. 
 
The technology-augmented results provide strong support for the weakest and, in one case, 
for the strong hypotheses, most especially over the 100 year time horizon. The estimates of 
β1 are closest to 1 in the case of GSTFP30, that is a measure where GS is augmented by “the 
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value of time” introduced by exogenous technological change with effects lasting 30 years. 
Over a 100 year time horizon, we find that the difference between GREENTFP and GSPTFP is 
negligible in the case of the weaker hypothesis. In contrast to the results without including 
TFP, the null of no-cointegration cannot be rejected for any TFP-augmented results over 100 
year time horizons. The strong joint hypothesis is not rejected for GSTFP30, although the 
intercept individually is significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
The results in table 6, where we use the alternative real wage-based measure of well-being, 
reinforce the case for augmenting investment with the value of technological progress. In 
particular the estimates of β1 are in the range 1.16-1.37 for the 100 year time horizon. While 
all these estimates are significantly different to 1, the contrast is marked with the results 
obtained without including any augmentation from technological progress displayed in  
Table 2, which are in the range 2.39-2.71. Nevertheless, the real wage-based results are not 
so clearly in favor of the weaker hypothesis as those utilizing consumer spending as a 
measure of well-being. This may partly reflect issues of data quality as the samples are 
pushed back to 1765 in the former but begin only after 1870 with the latter. However, over 
the long run changes in income distribution have probably favored wage earners. If so, 
current investment would have a larger effect on future real wages than on future 
consumption.12 One outlier in Table 6 is the GREENTFP20 result over the 20 year time 
horizon using real wages, which does not reject the strong hypothesis. 
                                                          
12
 We are grateful to a referee who suggested unionization may have been an influence on UK income 
distribution over the sample period. Other distribution influences include import prices and tax rates, for a full 
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Table 6 about here 
 
3.5 Truncating the investment sample period 
 
Our core results utilize the longest samples feasible for each well-being horizon to 
investigate how well the theory (which is based on infinite horizons) holds up over the very 
long-run. A downside of using the longest feasible samples when assessing if β1 tends to 1 as 
horizons extend is that the varying sample size may influence outcomes. Accordingly, the 
results of Table 7 (and 8) truncate all investment samples at 1909, irrespective of the well-
being horizon. 
Table 7 about here 
 
With the investment samples confined to the period 1870-1909, the progressive extension 
of the horizon for future changes in consumption to 100 years yields estimates of β1 that 
become closer to 1.  This finding applies to the results with and without augmentation for 
technological change. Although GS, GSPTFP20 and GSTFP30 have estimates of β1 that are 
closer to 1, they  cannot be considered statistically robust with no-cointegration not 
rejected. Investment samples from the period 1765-1909 always over-predict future real 
wages in the variants without technology: over any time horizon future real wages were 
higher than GS predicts. With technology included, the estimates of β1 are in the range of 
0.64-1.36 and rise with longer horizons. Those at the 50 year time horizon are closest to 1, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
discussion see Matthews et al [32] chapter 6. Real wages grew faster than consumption per capita 1870-2009, 
at 1.48% per year compared to 1.37% per year. 
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and the higher values with 100 year time horizon are likely to reflect that real wages grow 
more quickly than consumption per capita over the long-run.          
 
Table 8 about here 
 
 
3. 6 Adjusting Genuine Savings for Wealth Dilution 
 
In contrast to the finding of FHV, our results show adjusting the various investment 
measures for wealth dilution has a considerable effect on the estimated parameters, see 
Table 9. This may be due in part to differences in the estimation of aggregate wealth since 
FHV use a direct but partial measure rather than the ‘top down’ World Bank approach of our 
study.  Accounting for wealth dilution (see Figure 4 above) diminishes GS to negative values 
for long periods before 1945, although GSTFP ameliorates the effect. Without the TFP 
adjustment, the estimated β1 parameters show a high degree of variation over the different 
well-being horizons. The large negative value, for example for GS-WPOP over the 100 year 
time horizon reflects this measure of investment is falling up until 1909 while future well-
being measured up to 2009 rises.  
 
The wealth-adjusted results reinforce the importance of augmenting GS with technological 
progress. In the TFP variants illustrated in Table 9, all the β1 estimates are positive and fall 
within the range 0.71 to 2.41. Over the 100 year time horizon especially these estimates are 
considerably higher at 1.81 and 2.41, compared to the comparable estimates without the 
adjustment for wealth dilution of 1.15 and 1.20, see Table 8. A likely implication of these 
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results is that the wealth adjustment overstates the detrimental effects of dilution on future 
well-being, which in turn might arise from wealth measurement errors. In particular the 
measure of aggregate wealth rests on assumptions of the wealth to consumption ratio 
which may not hold over the very long-run. 
Table 9 about here 
 
 
 
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
The main contribution of this paper has been to undertake the first long-run test of the 
performance of Genuine Savings (GS) as an indicator of changes in future well-being. We 
constructed a British GS series back to 1765, and then tested how well GS indicates changes 
in future well-being over time periods of up to 100 years. For two alternative future well-
being measures (real wages and consumption per capita) our results conform more closely 
with the theoretical relationship between GS and future well-being, and provide stronger 
support for the indicative capacity of the GS model, than has been found by previous 
authors. In particular they show the value of extending the well-being horizon to a period of 
100 years and of incorporating a measure of technological progress in GS. The weaker 
sustainability hypothesis of a one to one relation (β1=1) between more inclusive measures 
of net investment and future well-being receives some support from our findings, although 
we typically reject the stronger joint hypothesis β0 = 0 and β1 = 1.  
However a number of caveats need to be highlighted. Our longest sample results utilize real 
wages to measure future well-being, and these data show some discrepancies with 
estimates using of consumption per capita, although the latter should accord more closely 
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with the underlying theory. Some elements of the pre-1870 data, including produced 
investment, are based upon decadal estimates. On balance our view is that the tests with 
the longest runs of data have utility, and their outcomes generally conform to the results 
based upon post-1870 data. An important issue for gauging future well-being over long 
horizons concerns the choice of discount rates. The results are sensitive to the discount 
rate, especially, unsurprisingly, over the longest 100 year time horizon. The preferred rate of 
2.5% per annum used here reflects the real interest paid on British government long-term 
debt since 1765.  
Incorporating the value of exogenous technology in measures of GS has substantial effects 
on some variants of the results, although in the case of future change in consumption it is 
the short horizon results that are most affected. Over the 100 year time horizon the 
estimates of β1 for both GS and the technology-augmented measure of GSTFP match 
closely. For future changes in real wages, the technology-augmented measures yield 
estimated parameters more closely aligned with theory than others measure of net 
investment.  Previous tests of GS’s indicative capacity have omitted a role for technology, 
but the results here support its inclusion in long run tests of sustainability, although complex 
issues surround its measurement.  
The exogenous measure of technological progress used here rests on estimates of TFP. In 
principle an endogenous measure of technology could be incorporated, as discussed by 
Pemberton and Ulph [27], and research in this area might prove fruitful, using for example 
measures of R&D. Constructing long series for investment in technology are currently not 
feasible. Those who are sympathetic to endogenous interpretations of economic growth do 
not deny that important elements of technological progress may be exogenous [33]. 
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However, GS includes elements of investment, notably human capital formation, which 
might be reflected in the measure of residual productivity.  While a good case can be made 
for incorporating a measure of residual productivity in GS there is no consensus how it 
should be done [5, 34].  
Strictly it is the value of technological progress to changes in the stock of wealth that needs 
to be gauged and added to GS [11]. Pezzey et al [16] propose a measure which utilizes the 
discounted future value of TFP, although they give no firm guidance on the horizon or the 
choice of discount rate. In light of the uncertainty surrounding the longevity of the value of 
technological progress, two horizons were used here, of 20 and 30 years, but the empirical 
differences appeared negligible. Furthermore, two technology-augmented measures, 
GREENTFP and GSTFP were also used in empirical tests, with the former designed to avoid 
the double counting of residual productivity. Again, in the empirical tests, only minor 
differences between estimates were found.  Alternatives to exogenous measures of 
technological progress are worth investigation, but the results here show exogenous 
measures have utility. 
At present, we follow the World Bank approach and measure changes in human capital via 
public investment in education. Yet for much of the time period under consideration, most 
workers spent little time in school, and thus public educational investments are unlikely to 
be good measures of their capacities [37]. It is thus important to investigate other ways of 
measuring changes in the human capital stock, for example appraoches based around 
discounted lifetime earnings [38]. Preliminary analysis for the UK shows that a discounted 
lifetime earnings approach would produce far higher estimates of the human capital stock 
than the expenditures on education approach [39]. 
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There are also other enhancements that could be made to the ways in which GS are 
calculated. One is in the measurement of wealth. The top down approach used by necessity 
here probably overstates the capital dilution associated with a higher population. Nor is 
pollution presently included in our GS calculations. Whilst CO2 emissions were rising over 
the period of our analysis, it is questionable how significant the resultant damages per unit 
of emission were over almost all of our period, since global stocks of greenhouse gases were 
far below critical levels. Rather more importantly for the time period under considerations, 
emissions of conventional pollutants such as particulates had a major impact on health [35, 
36]. Using a discounted lifetime’s earnings approach to human capital would allow the 
impact of air pollution on workers to be directly included in GS calculations. Finally, we note 
that future work, which enhanced the coverage of historical data to more aspects of natural 
capital changes, would be desirable.  
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Data appendix: 
 
Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables 
 Count Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
NETPINV 224 239.24 278.03 -727.78 1066.04 
GREENINV 224 157.36 258.07 -824.01 1003.52 
GS 224 247.12 360.73 -743.18 1472.60 
GREENTFP20 224 815.17 917.13 23.25 3654.60 
GREENTFP30 224 997.67 1105.80 34.49 4456.49 
GSTFP20 224 904.92 1067.23 23.25 4219.93 
GSTFP30 224 1087.42 1256.52 34.49 5021.83 
GSWPOP 224 -267.37 424.76 -1516.07 1422.01 
GSTFP20WPOP 224 390.43 1117.66 -664.04 3807.49 
PVΔCons20 121 826.6887 886.3903 -136.206 3247.617 
PVΔCons50 91 826.3648 728.5775 118.1688 2499.604 
PVΔCons100 41 498.7835 187.7609 246.6412 821.1678 
PVΔRW20 225 833.7201 970.2563 -568.069 3406.722 
PVΔRW50 195 886.4572 868.6192 67.91884 3291.732 
PVΔRW100 145 458.1318 302.2781 87.97897 1180.489 
Note: The present value of future changes in consumption, real wages and TFP is discounted at 2.5% 
per annum. All variables are expressed as £ per capita in 2000 prices. 
 
GDP and GDP deflator: Nominal GDP 1765-1870 from Broadberry et al [22]; 1870-2010 from 
Measuring Worth, http://www.measuringworth.com/ukgdp/  and last accessed June 2013. Full 
details of the income, output and expenditure estimates adopted in the post- 1870 data are listed in 
Officer, What Was the UK GDP Then: A Data Study, accessible from the Measuring Worth site. The 
GDP deflator is from the same sources.  
Population: 1830-2010 is calculated using the Measuring Worth UK population data minus the 
populations of Ireland from 1830-1920 and Northern Ireland from 1921-2010. 1750-1830 is from 
Wrigley’s [40] annual population estimates of England and Wales, combined with those for Scotland, 
derived from Flinn [41] and Census of Scotland from 1801 onwards. 
NETPINV: 1765-1920 is from Feinstein and Pollard [19], 1921-65 from Feinstein [17]. 1966-2000 is 
from UK ONS publications. For the period 1760-1855 NFCF and inventories were reported as decadal 
averages as was net overseas investment 1760-1870. In both cases annual estimates are 
interpolated. 
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GREENINV: Forestry:  Stock estimates for the woodland area (hectares) and standing volume (cubic 
metres per hectare) are from British agricultural returns, Schlich [42], Stamp and Beaver [43], the 
1923 and 1947 woodland censuses, Eurostat and the UK Forestry Commission. International trade 
prices per cubic metre are used to value the standing volume given Great Britain was a net importer 
of timber. A variety of prices estimates are combined, including UK import prices from 1760-1810 
and 1847-1957, Finnish export prices from 1810-1847, and US export prices from 1965-2000 [44-52]. 
Average prices are used in the absence of the single long run series, for details see McLaughlin et al 
[18]. Felling costs are estimated as wage costs per m3.  MacGregor [53 p.30] shows labour costs were 
the ‘greatest direct influence on the cost of forestry operations’, but he reports daily rates, not the 
cost per m3. Labour costs per m3 are estimated from the employment of felling and forest workers 
and annual felling. Employment in forestry has been estimated for 1765-1840 assuming 5 workers 
per 100 acres [54], based on Heske’s [55] claim that each 35 cubic feet of wood cut needed one 
day’s work. Census data provides employment of woodcutters from 1841 to 1921 as do Forestry 
Commission reports for later years. The felling data used to construct the estimates of wage costs 
per m3 are from [56, 50] and Forestry Statistics 2001.  
Minerals: Coal: Estimates of coal extraction are from [57-61] and from UK Mineral Statistics and UK 
Mineral Yearbook. Pithead prices per tonne are from [59-64], NCB reports, UK Mineral Statistics and 
UK Mineral Yearbook. Wage estimates were taken from [58-61, 64] and National Coal Board reports. 
The nineteenth century data are for hewers and were reported as daily wages in [58] and shift rates 
in both [61] and [59]. Labour force numbers were taken from the Annual Returns of Mines from 
1874 onwards [60], from census returns [60, 65], and estimated assuming productivity of 250 tons 
per worker for years to 1874. 
Iron Ore: Extraction data are from the official series beginning in 1854 and earlier estimates from 
[66, 67]. Mine-head prices from 1854 onwards are also reported in the Mineral Statistics. The 
integrated organisational structure of the British iron industry makes it difficult to ascertain iron ore 
prices pre-1854. We assume the price of iron ore was a ratio of the price of pig iron, adopting 10% of 
the pig iron price, which was the average ratio 1857-1914. British iron production dwindles in 
importance by 1900, and US prices are used for the period 1915-2000, taken from Kelly et al. [68], to 
value the small quantities of British production. Daily wage rates across all the mining industries 
were similar [69], though wage costs per ton differed. From the 1907 census of production output 
per man year (OMY) for iron ore miners was 611 tons [70] versus an OMY of 321 tons for coal miners 
[71]. Labour productivity in iron ore mining was around twice that of coal and therefore their labour 
costs per ton would have been about half that of coal mining. We use this relativity to estimate wage 
costs per ton for iron ore mining.  Data on tin, copper, lead and zinc extraction are from Mitchell [60] 
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and UK Mineral Statistics and Mineral Yearbooks. There are no separate employment data for these 
mining operations and wage costs per ton, given the similar extraction technology, are assumed 
equal to those for iron ore mining.  
Oil and gas: extraction estimates are from Energy Trends 2002. Historic oil prices per barrel are from 
the BP Statistical Review of World Energy and converted to price per tonne, taking a barrel to equal 
to 0.136 tonnes. Dollar prices are converted to pounds with the historic exchange rates from Officer 
[72]. The marginal costs of oil and gas extraction are assumed to be zero.  
 
GS: The education investment data are from Carpentier [23]. 
GSTFP: TFP: real gross capital stock is from Feinstein [17, 19] and O’Mahony [73]. Labour hours are 
from Crafts [29], Voth [30], Wrigley [40], Flinn [41], Feinstein [17], and O’Mahony [73].Factor shares, 
which are used to measure the output elasticities assuming wages equate to marginal product of 
labour, are from Crafts [29], Matthews et al [32] and ONS [74].  The factor shares are:   1760-1860, 
α= 0.50; 1856-1920, α=0.58; 1920-1951, α=0.70; 1951-1973, α=0.73; 1973-2000, α=0.64. Annual TFP 
has been calculated except for 1760 to 1860 where an annual series has been interpolated from 
decadal data. The trend growth TFP is a Kalman filter of the TFP growth rate. TFP trend growth post 
2007 is forecast using an ARIMA (3,1,3) forecast. 
Wealth: Wealth is the present value of a 3 year average of consumption (government and private) at 
constant prices over 25 years. Post-1870 consumption data are from Feinstein [17] and ONS. For 
earlier years public consumption and private consumption are based on occasional estimates of 
consumption and GDP. From 1760 to 1869 consumption has been estimated as a constant 93.52% 
share of GDP, which is the average for 1870 to 1900. The choice of discount rate follows World Bank 
[3, 8] and uses a 1.5% per annum rate of pure time preference. 
Future well-being:  Real Wages: These are from Measuring Worth. Full details of the component 
series are discussed in Clark [31], accessible via the Measuring Worth site.  Present values are 
constructed utilizing a 2.5% per annum discount rate which equates to the average interest on 
British government long bonds 1765-2000 less retail price inflation, as reported by Measuring 
Worth. Consumption: The post-1870 estimates are from Feinstein [17] and ONS. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1 : Net Produced Investment as % GDP 1760-2000 
 
 NFCF Inventories Net Domestic Net Overseas NETPINV 
1760-1860 2.64 1.08 3.72 1.15 4.87 
1860-1914 3.73 0.74 4.47 4.70 9.17 
1914-1918 0.07 -0.62 -0.55 0.21 -0.34 
1918-1938 2.39 0.01 2.40 0.82 3.22 
1939-1945 -0.91 -0.20 -0.71 -7.56 -8.27 
1946-1968 7.42 0.96 8.38 0.01 8.39 
1946-2000 7.06 0.60 7.66 -0.22 7.44 
Note: NFCF is net domestic fixed capital formation. Sources: see Data Appendix. 
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Table 2:  Estimates of β0 and β1 for three Investment series and future real wages 
(2.5% per annum discount rate) 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Dependent Independent β0 β1 β0=0; & β1=1 β1=1 ADF 
Real Wage 
20 years 
NETPINV 280.3* 
(63.9) 
2.32* 
(0.174) 
208.4* 
(0.00) 
57.2* 
(0.00) 
-3.59* 
Real Wage 
50 years 
 827.1* 
(81.2) 
0.37 
(0.33) 
141.1* 
(0.00) 
 
3.51** 
(0.06) 
 
0.48 
Real Wage 
100 years 
 68.2* 
(24.4) 
2.39* 
(0.13) 
608.8* 
(0.00) 
123.1* 
(0.00) 
-5.10* 
Real Wage 
20 years 
GREENINV 579.4* 
(68.5) 
1.62* 
(0.23) 
141.4* 
(0.00) 
7.49* 
(0.01) 
-2.84 
Real Wage 
50 years 
 906.9* 
(70.9) 
-0.20 
(0.33) 
171.4* 
(0.00) 
 
13.0* 
(0.00) 
1.08 
Real Wage 
100 years 
 108.7* 
(23.7) 
 
2.89* 
(0.16) 
732.2* 
(0.00) 
140.7* 
(0.00) 
-6.21* 
Real Wage 
20 years 
GS 377.9* 
(57.0) 
1.85* 
(0.13) 
198.3* 
(0.00) 
42.4* 
(0.00) 
-3.56* 
Real Wage 
50 years 
 776.7* 
(73.7) 
0.81* 
(0.31) 
151.1* 
(0.00) 
0.37 
(0.54) 
-0.08 
Real Wage 
100 years 
 108.9* 
(19.9) 
 
2.71* 
(0.12) 
967.2* 
(0.00) 
199.0* 
(0.00) 
-7.13* 
 
Notes: Dependent = the present values of future changes in real wages measured over 20-100 year horizons. For 
column 3, H0: β0=0; H1: β0≠0 and for column 4 H0: β1=0; H1: β1≠0 are tested using a ‘t’ test where * denotes 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level and ** at the 10% level.  For columns 3 and 4 figures in 
parentheses are standard errors.  For column 5 H0: β0=0 and β1=1; H1: β0≠0 and β1≠1 are tested jointly using a 
Wald test where * denotes significantly different from zero and unity respectively at the 5% level. For column 6, 
H0: β1=1; H1: β1≠1 is tested using a Wald test where * denotes significantly different from unity at the 5% level. 
For columns 5 & 6 figures in parentheses refer to p values for the Wald test where the test statistic is distributed 
as 
2
 with 2 (column 5) or 1 (column 6) degrees of freedom respectively. In column 7 ADF represents the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller statistic (corrected for the problem of Generated Regressors) where the degree of 
augmentation is determined by the Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria. A * represents rejects the null of non-
stationary residuals at the 5% level and ** at the 10% level. 
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Table 3: Estimates of β0 and β1 for three Investment series and future real wages 
(3.5% per annum discount rate) 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Dependent Independent β0 β1 β0=0; & 
β1=1 
β1=1 ADF 
Real Wage 
20 years 
NETPINV 230.8* 
(52.6) 
1.91* 
(0.15) 
166.5* 
(0.00) 
40.2* 
(0.00) 
-3.59* 
Real Wage 
50 years 
 509.0* 
(49.9) 
0.23* 
(0.20) 
117.1* 
(0.00) 
14.1* 
(0.00) 
0.48 
Real Wage 
100 years 
 25.8* 
(9.25) 
0.90* 
(0.05) 
8.15* 
(0.00) 
4.03* 
(0.00) 
-5.01* 
Real Wage 
20 years 
GREENINV 477.1* 
(56.4) 
1.34* 
(0.18) 
124.2* 
(0.00) 
3.22** 
(0.07) 
-2.58 
Real Wage 
50 years 
 558.2* 
(43.7) 
-0.12 
(0.20) 
163.8* 
(0.00) 
30.2* 
(0.00) 
-1.08 
Real Wage 
100 
 41.2* 
(9.00) 
1.09* 
(0.06) 
102.9* 
(0.00) 
2.45 
(0.18) 
-6.22* 
Real Wage 
20 years 
GS 311.2* 
(46.9) 
1.52* 
(0.11) 
153.0* 
(0.00) 
23.75* 
(0.00) 
-4.00* 
Real Wage 
50 years 
 478.0* 
(45.3) 
0.50* 
(0.19) 
125.9* 
(0.00) 
7.14* 
(0.00) 
-0.52 
Real Wage 
100 years 
 41.24* 
(7.43) 
1.02* 
(0.05) 
99.6* 
(0.00) 
0.37 
(0.54) 
-7.13* 
See Table 2 notes for explanations of null/alternative hypotheses and levels of significance. 
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Table 4: Estimates of β0 and β1 for three Investment series and future 
consumption (2.5% per annum discount rate) 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Dependent Independent β0 β1 β0=0; & 
β1=1 
β1=1 ADF 
Cons 20 NETPINV 322.9* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.46* 56.2* 5.3* -2.59 
 
 
  (96.4) (0.19) (0.00) (0.02)  
Cons 50  871.8* -0.22 81.5* 16.3* 0.01 
  (98.9) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  381.6* 0.40 52.5* 2.19 -0.50 
  (120.9) (0.40) (0.00) (0.14)  
Cons 20 GREENINV 684.6* 0.65* 61.7* 2.33 -0.73 
  (94.2) (0.23) (0.00) (0.13)  
Cons 50  862.1* -0.28 104.0* 20.1* 0.11 
  (84.5) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  348.7* 0.68 95.3* 0.75 -1.25 
  (87.0) (0.37) (0.00) (0.39)  
Cons 20 GS 383.7* 1.14* 44.7* 0.91 -3.17** 
  (88.3) (0.15) (0.00) (0.34)  
Cons 50  787.6* 0.20 76.2* 8.46* -0.02 
  (93.7) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  241.3* 1.04* 91.8* 0.02 -2.33 
  (81.3) (0.31) (0.00) (0.90)  
Notes: Dependent = the present values of future changes in real consumption per capita measured over 
20-100 year horizons. See Table 2 notes for explanations of null/alternative hypotheses and levels 
of significance. 
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Table 5: Estimates of β0 and β1 for technology-augmented Investment series and 
future consumption (2.5% per annum discount rate) 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Dependent Independent β0 β1 β0=0; & β1=1 β1=1 ADF 
Cons 20 GREENTFP20 -227.4* 0.79* 192.3* 26.9* -4.25* 
  (66.6) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  -253.0* 1.29* 14.7* 14.6* -2.53 
  (72.9) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  -128.3 1.13* 6.46* 0.47 -3.49* 
  (111.3) (0.19) (0.04) (0.49)  
Cons 20 GSTFP20 -202.0* 0.69* 434.7* 96.8* -4.33* 
  (60.1) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  -248.3* 1.18* 13.2* 7.83* -2.51 
  (69.1) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  -148.3 1.12* 17.0* 0.56 -3.93* 
  (93.6) (0.16) (0.00) (0.45)  
Cons 20 GREENTFP30 -294.1* 0.68* 596.5* 100.2* -4.23* 
  (63.7) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  -383.5* 1.14* 80.3* 9.09* -2.85 
  (56.8) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  -190.6* 1.01* 68.7* 0.25 -4.19* 
  (85.3) (0.13) (0.00) (0.61)  
Cons 20 GSTFP30 -260.9* 0.60* 1041.4* 234.3* -4.28* 
  (58.4) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  -362.2* 1.05* 124.2* 1.50 -2.75 
  (55.3) (0.04) (0.00) (0.22)  
Cons 100  -177.2* 1.00* 114.5
*
*****
* 
0.00 -4.38* 
  (72.9) (0.10) (0.00) (0.97)  
 
Notes: Dependent = the present values of future changes in real consumption per capita measured over 20-
100 year horizons. The measures GREENTFP and GSTFP augment GREENINV and GS using a 2.5% per 
annum discount rate for the value technological progress over both 20 and 30 year time horizons, 
labeled GREENTFP20/30 and GSTFP20/30. See Table 2 notes for explanations of null/alternative 
hypotheses and levels of significance.  
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Table 6: Estimates of β0 and β1 for technology-augmented Investment series and 
future real wages (2.5% per annum discount rate) 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Dependent Independent β0 β1 β0=0; & β1=1 β1=1 ADF 
Real Wage 
20 years 
GREENTFP20 48.5* 
(35.4) 
 
0.97* 
(0.29) 
1.96 
(0.38) 
1.26 
(0.26) 
-4.58* 
Real Wage 
50 years 
 65.7 
(40.9) 
1.64* 
(0.06) 
370.8* 
(0.00) 
116.4* 
(0.00) 
-3.20** 
Real Wage 
100 years 
 44.6* 
(18.2) 
1.37* 
(0.05) 
293.8* 
(0.00) 
53.7* 
(0.00) 
-4.09* 
Real Wage 
20 years 
GSTFP20 85.0* 
(34.7) 
0.83* 
(0.24) 
52.7* 
(0.00) 
46.1* 
(0.00) 
-4.30* 
Real Wage 
50 years 
 84.5* 
(38.7) 
1.50* 
(0.05) 
266.6* 
(0.00) 
94.0* 
(0.00) 
-3.14** 
Real Wage 
100 years 
 50.8* 
(16.3) 
1.30* 
(0.04) 
311.4* 
(0.00) 
52.0* 
(0.00) 
-4.39* 
Real Wage 
20 years 
GREENTFP30 32.7 
(34.7) 
0.81* 
(0.02) 
107.7* 
(0.00) 
68.9* 
(0.00) 
-4.28* 
Real Wage 
50 years 
 25.7 
(32.1) 
1.38* 
(0.04) 
250.9* 
(0.00) 
104.9* 
(0.00) 
-3.27* 
Real Wage 
100 years 
 31.9* 
(15.9) 
1.20* 
(0.37) 
171.8* 
(0.00) 
29.6* 
(0.00) 
-4.27* 
Real Wage 
20 years 
GSTFP30 66.5* 
(33.3) 
0.71* 
(0.02) 
291.6* 
(0.00) 
198.4* 
(0.00) 
-4.07* 
Real Wage 
50 years 
 48.1 
(31.2) 
1.28* 
(0.03) 
183.0* 
(0.00) 
67.3* 
(0.00) 
-3.30** 
Real Wage 
100 years 
 40.2* 
(14.5) 
1.16* 
(0.03) 
163.7* 
(0.00) 
22.1* 
(0.00) 
-4.50* 
See Tables 2 and 5 notes for explanations of the variables and hypothesis tests. 
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Table 7: Estimates of β0 and β1 for seven Investment series and future consumption (2.5% 
per annum discount rate) and 1870-1909 sample 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6
. 
7. 
Dependent Independent β0 β1 β0=0; & β1=1 β1=1 ADF 
Cons 20 NETPINV 198.9* -0.10 65.1* 20.3* -1.77 
  (73.0) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  174.0* 0.21 48.5* 26.0* -1.34 
  (46.0) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  369.0* 0.47 56.2* 1.76 -0.93 
  (119.4) (0.40) (0.00) (0.18)  
Cons 20 GREENINV 224.5* -0.25 38.3* 29.9* -2.05 
  (53.3) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  184.6* 0.23 30.2* 28.2* -1.31 
  (33.7) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  344.7* 0.73* 101.6
*
**** 
0.56 -1.57 
  (85.4) (0.36) (0.00) (0.45)  
Cons 20 GS 261.9* -0.37 66.9* 46.5* -2.40 
  (52.7) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  164.1* 0.29* 32.3* 31.2* -1.41 
  (33.2) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  243.8* 1.06* 98.9* 0.03 -2.54 
  (79.5) (0.30) (0.00) (0.85)  
Cons 20 GREENTFP20 392.2* -0.40* 638.5* 92.0* -2.59 
  (82.4) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  74.4 0.29* 1010.3* 59.6* -1.77 
  (51.7) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  -119.9 1.13* 5.32**
*** 
0.47 -3.63* 
  (108.3) (0.19) (0.07) (0.49)  
Cons 20 GSTFP20 399.5* -0.39* 775.4* 120.4* -2.61 
  (75.4) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  75.4 0.28* 1241.5* 81.3* -1.80 
  (47.5) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  -136.4 1.10* 15.2* 0.48 -4.01* 
  (91.3) (0.15) (0.00) (0.49)  
Cons 20 GREENTFP30 414.6* -0.38* 1075.6* 150.9* -2.58 
  (74.4) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  71.4 0.25* 1806.8* 109.5* -1.85 
  (47.3) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  --176.9* 1.05* 66.0* 0.17 -4.26* 
  (83.4) (0.13) (0.00) (0.68)  
Cons 20 GSTFP30 410.5* -0.36* 1248.8* 185.9* -2.54 
  (68.9) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 50  77.1** 0.24* 2109.5* 144.6* -1.82 
  (44.0) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)  
Cons 100  -163.2* 0.99* 111.8
* 
0.01 -4.44* 
  (71.5) (0.10) (0.00) (0.92)  
 See Tables 2 and 5 notes for explanations of the variables and hypothesis tests. 
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Table 8: Estimates of β0 and β1 for seven Investment series and future real wages (2.5% per 
annum discount rate) and 1765-1909 sample 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Dependent Independent β0 β1 β0=0; & β1=1 β1=1 ADF 
Real Wage 20 NETINV 13.7 1.71* 64.5* 16.4* -3.89* 
  (34.0) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 50  144.1* 1.81* 643.5* 57.4* -5.81* 
  (20.8) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 100  68.2* 2.39* 608.8* 123.0* -5.11* 
  (24.4) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 20 GREENINV 71.8* 1.82* 85.7* 12.7* -3.63* 
  (34.4) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 50  184.7* 2.10* 707.8* 59.2* -5.98* 
  (21.4) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 100  108.8* 2.89* 732.2* 140.7* -6.22* 
  (23.7) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 20 GS 95.2* 1.52* 69.9* 6.44* -3.36** 
  (34.0) (0.21) (0.00) (0.01)  
Real Wage 50  200.8* 1.85* 642.7* 43.3* -5.32* 
  (20.9) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 100  108.9* 2.71* 967.2* 199.1* -7.13* 
  (19.6) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 20 GREENTFP20 34.7 0.85* 2.72 2.41 -3.35** 
  (35.2) (0.09) (0.26) (0.12)  
Real Wage 50  136.7* 1.00* 182.6* 0.00 -4.61* 
  (18.3) (0.04) (0.00) (0.99)  
Real Wage 100  44.6* 1.36* 293.8* 53.7* -4.09* 
  (18.6) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 20 GSTFP20 50.4 0.78* 6.59* 5.71* -3.14** 
  (35.0) (0.09) (0.04) (0.02)  
Real Wage 50  149.6* 0.93* 153.3* 1.84 -4.31* 
  (18.5) (0.05) (0.00) (0.17)  
Real Wage 100  50.9* 1.31* 311.3* 52.0* -4.39* 
  (16.2) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 20 GREENTFP30 46.4* 0.69* 22.1* 12.6* -3.28** 
  (36.4) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 50  136.5* 0.86* 79.4* 10.4* -4.21* 
  (18.8) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 100  31.9* 1.20* 171.8* 29.7* -4.28* 
  (15.9) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 20 GSTFP30 60.4** 0.64* 30.6* 18.8* -3.02 
  (36.1) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 50  149.2* 0.80* 73.6* 20.4* -3.97* 
  (19.1) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)  
Real Wage 100  40.2* 1.15* 163.7* 22.1* -4.49* 
  (14.6) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)  
See Tables 2 and 5 notes for explanations of the variables and hypothesis tests. 
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Table 9: Estimates of β0 and β1 for wealth-dilution adjusted Investment series and 
future real wages (2.5% per annum discount rate) 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Dependent Independent β0 β1 β0=0; & β1=1 β1=1 ADF 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 20y 
NETPINV- 
WPOP 
1301.8* 
(78.8) 
1.44* 
(0.17) 
385.9* 
(0.00) 
6.27* 
(0.01) 
-4.89* 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 50y 
 1090.0* 
(133.7) 
-0.33 
(0.30) 
554.8* 
(0.00) 
19.6* 
(0.00) 
0.59 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 100y 
 -313.1* 
(152.4) 
-4.18* 
(0.37) 
1521.5* 
(0.00) 
197.4* 
(0.00) 
-3.37* 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 20y 
GREENINV- 
WPOP 
1302.0* 
(97.4) 
 
1.15* 
(0.20) 
375.2* 
(0.00) 
0.58 
(0.44) 
-3.86* 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 50y 
 913.6* 
(141.4) 
-0.69* 
(0.28) 
622.1* 
(0.00) 
35.5* 
(0.00) 
0.67 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 100y 
 -411.4* 
(137.5) 
-4.00* 
(0.30) 
1927.7* 
(0.00) 
278.2* 
(0.00) 
-3.52* 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 20y 
GS- 
WPOP 
1266.2* 
(69.6) 
1.34* 
(0.14) 
418.2* 
(0.00) 
6.15* 
(0.01) 
-4.91* 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 50y 
 1175.7* 
(134.9) 
-0.10* 
(0.28) 
564.9* 
(0.00) 
15.0* 
(0.00) 
0.23 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 100y 
 -384.4* 
(149.9) 
-3.99* 
(0.33) 
1688.3* 
(0.00) 
225.7* 
(0.00) 
-3.20** 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 20y 
GREENTFP20- 
WPOP 
560.2* 
(39.7) 
0.81* 
(0.03) 
199.5* 
(0.00) 
31.4* 
(0.00) 
-6.77* 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 50y 
 1160.5* 
(38.2) 
1.51* 
(0.07) 
1005.6* 
(0.00) 
49.4* 
(0.00) 
-6.71* 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 100y 
 1721.9* 
(152.0) 
1.81* 
(0.63) 
582.3* 
(0.00) 
1.62 
(0.20) 
-0.73 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 20y 
GSTFP20- 
WPOP 
540.2* 
(39.7) 
0.71* 
(0.03) 
204.7* 
(0.00) 
84.5* 
(0.00) 
-6.59* 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 50y 
 1124.5* 
(37.4) 
1.43* 
(0.07) 
1003.4* 
(0.00) 
41.7* 
(0.00) 
-6.61* 
Real Wage- 
Wealth 100y 
 1838.7* 
(141.5) 
2.41* 
(0.60) 
613.7* 
(0.00) 
5.52* 
(0.00) 
-1.42 
 
The dependent variable is based upon:         (       ) from Equation 3, for 20-100y (years) 
well-being horizons. Independent: WPOP is a wealth dilution adjustment defined as the product of 
population growth rate and wealth per capita. 
See Table 2 notes for explanations of null/alternative hypotheses and levels of significance. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Trend TFP growth rate, 1766-2020 (% per annum) 
 
 
Notes: for sources and methods see Data Appendix  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
Figure 2: Five alternative investment series as % of GDP 
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Figure 3: Five investment series per capital (£, 2000 prices) 
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Figure 4: Genuine Savings per capita adjusted for Wealth Dilution (£, 2000 prices) 
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Figure 5: Present value of future changes in real wages   
2.5% per annum discount rate (£, 2000 prices) 
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